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0ABSTRACT
Bequest tax revenues have been constantly declining in all OECD countries for at least seventy
years. We propose an explanation which is based on a dynamic politico-economic model where
the evolution of bequest taxation is determined by wealth inequality. Since economic development
induces a growing role of labor income and thus a reduction of wealth inequality, bequest taxation
is reduced over time. Our model also explains cross-country diﬀerences in the level and speed of
adjustment of the tax, by embedding structural reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing and
a consequent shift of the tax base from easy-to-tax land to hard-to-tax capital. This implies a lower
tax level, and a slower equalization-induced tax reduction, the higher is the tax avoidance rate and
the less developed is the economy. Finally, the introduction of franchise restrictions which are
gradually lifted over time allows the model to reproduce the humped-shaped long-term evolution
of bequest taxation starting from the nineteenth century for those countries that are now modern
industrial democracies, and also helps to explain the discrepancies currently observed between tax
systems in developed and underdeveloped countries.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: H20, P16, N40, O40.
Key Words: bequest tax, inequality, structural reallocation, redistribution, voting.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Bequest tax revenues have been constantly declining in all OECD countries for at least seventy
years. Recent policy debate and legislative proposals, in countries such as the US, the UK, France,
and Italy, are signaling a further acceleration of this decline. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
have abolished their bequest tax completely. In all other cases, the importance of the tax both in
terms of GDP and total revenues is now at a historical low point.
No explanation has yet been oﬀered for the vanishing role of bequest taxation. It is indeed
puzzling that this happens at a time when the fact that wealth is more concentrated than income
has become a well-established stylized fact.1 Together with persuasive additional evidence that
intergenerational transmission is a crucial factor in explaining wealth inequality,2 this would call
for an important role of bequest taxation, a policy tool that has always been employed to enhance
progressivity within a tax system.3 A possible answer to this puzzle can come from another body of
recent empirical evidence which has shown that wealth inequality has declined dramatically during
the twentieth century.4
The fact that wealth inequality, despite being substantial, is yet declining suggests a rationale
for the evolution of bequest taxation which we develop within a politico-economic model where
the distribution of wealth varies over time according to the stylized facts. However, while we
believe that the evolution of inequality represents a fundamental force aﬀecting bequest taxation,
the observed cross-country diﬀerences in the level, as well as in the variability, of revenues cannot
be fully explained by diﬀerences in inequality. The explanation we propose rests on diﬀerential
rates of avoidance and evasion of the tax, combined with an evolution of wealth composition which
also occurs at diﬀerential rates.
We combine these channels in a politico-economic model of a dynamic, tow-sector economy.
The ﬁrst channel at work in our model links inequality, voting and redistribution in the tradition
of Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) application of the median voter theorem. However, Meltzer and
Richard (1981) focus on a static setting with a time invariant wealth distribution, where the ex-
pansion on the size of government is explained by an exogenous extension of the voting franchise.
1See for example Diaz-Gimenez et al.(1997) for data on the US in the postwar period.
2See Harbury (1973) and Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1981), among others.
3Piketty and Saez (2007) present evidence on relevance of estate taxes for progressivity in historical and interna-
tional perspective.
4See Wolﬀ (1996), Atkinson and Piketty (2007), and the discussion in Section 3.
2Here we apply the median voter theorem to a dynamic model where non-overlapping generations
of agents, diﬀerentiated only in terms of their initial wealth holdings, derive utility from their own
consumption and from bequests. In other words, all saving is bequeathed. Since there is no uncer-
tainty, all bequests are voluntary. A tax is imposed on bequests in order to ﬁnance a redistributive
scheme, so that all individuals have a stake in the tax determination process. In particular, even if
the median voter may never have to pay a tax on bequests, as it often happens in the real world,
the fact that the tax is used for redistribution ensures that these ﬁscal scheme enters the median
voter’s indirect utility function. To concentrate on the redistributive eﬀect of the tax, we assume
preferences that guarantee the absence of distortions to the saving/bequest decision. In this frame-
work, the voter with median bequest will choose in each period the tax rate. The analysis of the
model shows that wealth inequality declines over time. This process is driven by the increasing
role of labor income and is also reinforced by redistributive taxation. As inequality declines, the
median voter’s relative holdings of bequests get closer and closer to the mean, inducing a sequence
of decreasing tax rates. These preliminary results replicate the observed secular fall of wealth
inequality and represent a ﬁrst step toward the understanding of the evolution of bequest taxation.
However, as previously argued, the standard Meltzer and Richard (1981) politico-economic
mechanism cannot capture the complexity of the workings of the bequest tax system. Therefore,
we add a second channel by embedding the same mechanism within a richer two-sector model
where bequests consist of two components, land and capital, whose relative weight varies over time
with industrialization. Land and capital are subject to an asymmetry when subject to taxation,
with taxes on capital being easier to avoid than taxes on land. Indeed taxes on landed property
are much more diﬃcult to elude or evade than those on capital or ﬁnancial wealth in general,
since it cannot be hidden or moved to a tax haven. We take this asymmetry as a deeply-rooted,
invariant characteristic of a tax system, which could only be aﬀected by radical transformation
of a country’s civic culture, but not by routine ﬁscal policy. Under the expanded framework, we
can evaluate the impact of structural reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing on the tax
bases of countries at varying stages of development, uncovering the fact that industrialization shifts
a country’s wealth, and thus its bequest tax base, from hard-to-avoid land toward easy-to-avoid
capital. Industrialization thus erodes the tax base in an asymmetric fashion. The asymmetry
between land and capital with respect to tax avoidance interferes with the process of structural
reallocation and with the determination of the dynamic political equilibrium of the model. Our
results show that, for given inequality, the level of the bequest tax decreases in the degree of
3avoidance of capital taxation. Intuitively, the median voter sets a lower tax, the higher is tax
asymmetry, since tax avoidance dilutes the redistributive impact of the tax, at a given collection
cost. The larger is inequality in ﬁnancial assets, the larger is the reduction of the tax due to
tax avoidance. On the other hand, the tax asymmetry delays the reduction of the tax due to
wealth equalization, especially when the tax base is disproportionately represented by land, whose
distribution tends to be relatively unequal and stable. To sum up, higher avoidance together with
ﬁscal asymmetries makes the tax rate lower, but also makes its reduction more sluggish, especially
when a country is still in a relatively underdeveloped stage. Our results can explain why in the US, a
country with high tax compliance (i.e., low avoidance), revenues from bequest taxes have been high
relatively to the rest of the OECD countries, but are now being phased out, while in the EU bequest
taxes have been lower, but their position appears to be more stable.5 Moreover, diﬀerent degrees
of avoidance could be the explanation of the radical diﬀerences between the systems of taxation
in developed and underdeveloped countries, with wealth and bequest taxes playing a minor role in
the latter, despite remarkable wealth concentration.
An important extension of the model allows for franchise requirements to be imposed on the
voting mechanism. The goal of this extension is three-fold. First, it broadens the horizon covered
by the model backward, to explain why bequest taxes were among the ﬁrst to be introduced
when modern systems of taxation were developed during the nineteenth century. If, in an early
stage, voting is restricted, even if wealth is unequally distributed no bequest tax is imposed in a
political equilibrium. Subsequently, with the gradual extension of the franchise, a tax on bequests
is introduced and expanded. Therefore, the introduction of a franchise requirement allows to
reproduce the humped-shaped long term evolution of the tax starting from the nineteenth century
for those countries that are now modern industrial democracies. Second, in the spirit of Sokoloﬀ
and Zolt (2005) who analyze the comparative evolution of tax systems in the Americas over the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we want to oﬀer an explanation for why diﬀerent countries
historically established diﬀerent tax structures, with Latin America developing a highly regressive
system despite large inequality, and more equal North America embracing instead a progressive
system. A franchise restriction can capture the idea that in those societies that began with extreme
inequality, elites were able to establish a legal framework that guaranteed them a monopoly over
5I t a l yi sa ne x c e p t i o n :t h eb e q u e s tt a xh a db e e na b o l i s h e di n2 0 0 1b yt h ec e n t e r - r i g h tg o v e r n m e n tt h e ni np o w e r ,
but the newly elected center-left coalition has reintroduced it in 2006, albeit in a softer fashion.
4political power, and thus to design a tax system that preserved inequality. In other words, the model
shows that, under extreme poverty, democratization may never start and bequest taxation may
never be implemented. This conclusion can also be applied to today’s underdeveloped countries,
where a low degree of democracy, captured again by restrictions to political power and in turn
linked to extreme inequality, can explain the minor role played by wealth and bequest taxes.
Another extension of the model accounts for the observed expansion of the size of government
in the face of reduced revenues from bequests, by introducing wage taxation and by exploiting
the impact of industrialization on the wage tax base. Finally, we discuss how the model could be
adapted to capture the impact of the residential capital stock on bequest taxation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the related literature. Section 3 reviews
the historical evidence on bequest taxation, as well as wealth inequality, structural change, and the
evolution of political systems. Section 4 presents the basic model. Section 5 contains the analysis
of the model. Section 6 brieﬂy explores extensions of the model. Section 7 summarizes our ﬁndings,
derives their implications for policy, and indicates directions for related future research.
2 Related literature
This paper is ﬁrst of all related to the stream of the literature, initiated by Alesina and Rodrik
(1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994), which has applied the basic Meltzer and Richard (1981)
framework to dynamic growth models. However, due to the non-neoclassical properties of the
production function, in these models once again wealth distribution remains time invariant, so
that the median voter choice is also time invariant. A separate stream of the literature has instead
focused explicitly on the evolution of wealth distribution, with Galor and Zeira (1993) showing that
under liquidity constraints the evolution of wealth distribution can lead to persistent, steady-state
inequality. In their setup, however, no attention is paid to voting mechanisms, and therefore on the
implications of the evolution of inequality on the political equilibrium and the associated sequence
of taxes. This paper establishes a link between these two streams by introducing a median voter
mechanism into a model where the distribution of wealth evolves with income growth.6
6While a full characterization of a dynamic median voter se t u pi sb e y o n dt h es c o p eo ft h ep r e s e n tp a p e r ,s i n c ea s
in Saint Paul and Verdier (1993) we adopt the simplifying assumption of a non-overlapping generations model with a
‘joy of giving’ bequest motive, this work is also related to more general treatments of capital taxation such as Krusell
and Rios-Rull (1999), who calibrate a fully dynamic model to match postwar US data, and Hassler et al. (2003), who
provide an analytical characterization of Markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting. Other examples
5Since we focus on a speciﬁc policy tool, the bequest tax, as the object of the median voter choice,
and we show how it evolves with wealth inequality, this paper is also naturally related with the
literature on intergenerational wealth transmission through bequests. Laitner (2001) establishes
the relevance of dynastic behavior for the emergence of wealth concentration. De Nardi (2004)
shows that only with voluntary, rather than accidental, bequests individual saving behavior can
generate a distribution of wealth that is more concentrated than that of labor earnings. Diﬀerent
systems of inheritance also matter for the evolution of inequality, as shown by Bertocchi (2006)
who compares primogeniture and equal partition.
There is also a vast research body that has studied optimal bequest taxation in a variety of
settings. The accent is usually on the trade-oﬀ between the redistributive equity it conveys and
the distortions to wealth accumulation it can cause. Most of these investigations are inherently
static, or else conducted at steady state. Cremer and Pestieau (2005) provide a survey of normative
contributions, from the standpoint of both equity and eﬃciency. Blumkin and Sadka (2003) com-
pare the properties of the optimal estate tax under altruistic and accidental bequests, and conclude
that estate taxation is supported only under the latter. With respect to this literature, we focus
our attention on redistribution under voluntary bequests and abstract from consideration of other
forms of saving behavior and distortions to the saving/bequest decision. Recent contributions also
include Benhabib and Bisin (2006), who ﬁnd that in an overlapping generations economy social
welfare is maximized with zero estate taxes, Fahri and Werning (2006), who establish that the
optimal estate tax is progressive under a welfare criterion that values future generations directly by
placing a positive weight on their welfare, and Bossmann et al. (2007), who employ the coeﬃcient
of variation as a measure of inequality to show that bequest taxation reinforces the equalizing eﬀect
of intergenerational wealth transfers on the distribution of wealth. In broader contexts, Kopczuk
(2003) links estate taxation to social security, while Aura (2004) compares the bequest tax with
the capital income tax.7
Land and the sectoral distribution of output play a crucial role in our model. Among others,
Cukierman et al. (1992) and Aizenman and Jinjarak (2006) have applied the distinction between
easy- vs. hard-to-avoid taxes, that we apply to capital vs. land, to other speciﬁc forms of gov-
of voting models where wealth distribution varies are Benabou (2000) and Das and Ghate (2004).
7Another stream of the public economics literature has focused on the post-war evolution of corporate taxation,
prompted by the fact that in the US corporate tax revenues fell precipitously during the late 1960s and the1970s.
However, since the early 1980s this trend has been reversed (see Auerbach, 2006), suggesting that corporate and
estate taxation may not be responding to the same factors.
6ernment revenue, namely income taxes vs. seigniorage. Other related implications of the role of
land in development are discussed in Eaton (1987), who develops a dynamic speciﬁc-factors model
similar to ours, Gollin et al. (2002), who stress the role of agriculture in explaining cross-country
income disparities, and Galor et al. (2006), who explore the impact of land ownership structure on
growth. Finally, Bertocchi (2006) and Caucutt et al. (2007) study the implications of an economy’s
structural transformation for the transition from primogeniture to partition and for the emergence
of social security, respectively.
Finally, this work is also deeply connected with the research program which has focussed on
the connection between development and institutions in a long-term perspective, in the tradition
of North (1981). More recently, this literature has been enriched by contributions of Engerman
and Sokoloﬀ (1997) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). The joint evolution of the economic and
political system is modeled, among others, by Cervellati et al. (2005), who show how economic
inequality is the main determinant of economic and political institutions. Sokoloﬀ and Zolt (2005),
on the basis of evidence collected for the Americas, argue that tax systems are among the oldest
and most fundamental of institutions, and suggest that inequality is the main force driving the
evolution of their structure.
3 Evidence
3.1 Estate taxation
All modern industrial economies rely extensively on progressive personal income taxes. None derives
signiﬁcant revenues from taxes on wealth transfers such as inheritance or estate taxes. Namely,
the ﬁrst is levied on the share of the bequest received by the individual recipient, and is applied
in most European countries. The latter is levied on the total estate of the donor, regardless of
the characteristics and the number of recipients, and is applied for instance in the US and the
UK. While most countries have some form of bequest taxation, Canada abolished its tax in 1972,
Australia in 1977, New Zealand in 1992, and Italy in 2001 (Duﬀ, 2005).
Gale and Slemrod (2001) provide a history of the estate tax in the US, where is was ﬁrst
introduced in 1797, only to be eliminated in 1802. Subsequent attempts to tax bequests were in
place between 1862 and 1870, in 1894, and between 1898 and 1902, typically in association with
military expenses. The precursor of the modern estate tax was ﬁnally introduced in 1913, as an
attempt to make the tax system more progressive. Legislative activity remained intense during the
71930s and the 1940s. In the postwar period the most signiﬁcant reform came in 1976, when the
Tax Reform Act signiﬁcantly reduced rates and raised exemptions. The pattern was conﬁrmed in
subsequent reforms, with a marked revenue reduction.
In 2001 the US Congress passed a bill according to which estate taxes are scheduled for repeal
in 2010, even if they are currently supposed to be re-enacted in 2011. The common perception
was that the Bush administration would have tried to eliminate the paradoxical 2011 restoration
and make the tax cut permanent. Action in that direction was indeed undertaken in April 2005
when the House of Representatives passed permanent repeal of the estate tax. However, the Senate
postponed scheduled action in September 2005 after hurricane Katrina. In June 2006, a clear
majority of the US Senate voted a bill for permanent repeal of the tax on inherited wealth, but the
measure fell short of the 60 votes required to secure passage.
A quantitative assessment of the developments just described is presented by Joulfanian (1998),
who provides ﬁgures for the share of estate taxes over total tax revenues, for the ﬁscal years 1917
through 1997. In ﬁscal year 1917, the year of enactment, estate tax receipts represent 0.8% of total
receipts, and they quickly increase to absorb 3.46% in 1922. After a temporary reduction, revenues
reach their peak, at 5.63%, in 1936. In the aftermath of World War II we observe a sharp decline,
after which the tax is bound to raise less than 2% of federal revenues in any year. Gale and Slemrod
(2001) show a similar hump-shaped pattern, with a peak in the 1930s, for estate tax revenues as a
percentage of GDP.
INSERT FIGURE 1
Flora (1983) reports comparable data on inheritance tax revenues over total tax revenues for
the central governments of a number of European countries for unbalanced samples within the
1860-1975 period. Figure 1 reports this evidence for Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, and the United Kingdom, for benchmark years running from 1860 to 1970.8 If we ignore
the temporary plunge in 1920, following World War I, the peak of bequest taxation is reached on
average around 1910. After the end of the 1930s, we observe a marked, uninterrupted decline in the
share of inheritance tax revenues in all the countries involved. At the same time, the graph reveals
large cross-country diﬀerences, with the UK reaching in 1910 a 18.3% peak. In the same year, the
next highest ﬁgure is shown by the Netherlands, at 9.8%, while most other countries are below
4%. However, by 1970, the share of inheritance tax revenues across all countries has converged to
8Data refer to the initial year of each of 12 decades (in some cases, data from adjacent years had to be substituted).
8a much narrower 0.5-2.3% interval. In the same ﬁgure, we also report the data for the US supplied
by Joulfanian (1998) and discussed in the previous paragraph. If compared with Europe, the US
are latecomers in implementing bequest taxation, as it is the case for the entire welfare state, but
their trend conﬁrms the hump-shaped pattern exhibited by Europe.
More recent OECD data on wealth transfer taxes are reported by Cremer and Pestieau (2001)
for a sample of industrialized countries in 1998. As a share of GDP, these taxes play an especially
important role in France (0.51%) and are signiﬁcant also in the US (0.36%), while they are negligible
for Italy (0.08%), with the other European countries somewhere in between. As a share of total
revenues, the US lead with 1.16%, and again Italy lags with 0.13%. However, comparisons are
complicated by the fact that, for instance, the deductible is much higher in the US, so that estate
taxation in the US concerns only the very wealthy. Since 1965, the evolution of bequest taxes has
not been uniform, with a more marked decline in the US and the UK at the beginning of the period,
and stability in most other cases.
A commonly cited possible reason for the low revenues generally associated with bequest taxes
is the administrative costs associated with them, which tend to be higher for inheritance taxes
(Aaron and Munnell, 1992). Avoidance, both in the form of elusion and evasion, is estimated
to be particularly widespread for bequest taxes (Cooper, 1979; Duﬀ, 2005). Discretionary trusts,
for example, could be used to transfer wealth while avoiding the tax. Gifts, to some extent,
can also be used as a means to reduce its impact. More aﬄuent taxpayers tend to be able to
employ more sophisticated tax-avoidance strategies. Moreover, diﬀerent components of wealth are
subject to diﬀerent degrees of tax avoidance, with tangible assets such as land and real estate being
much harder to hide or transfer abroad than ﬁnancial assets. While speciﬁc compliance data on
bequest taxation are not available, it is useful to report that the overall rate of tax compliance is
estimated at 74.5% for the US, 77.8% for the UK, and at 29.5% for Italy, with even lower ﬁgures
for underdeveloped countries, e.g., 23.8% for Rwanda. The source is the World Economic Forum,
1996.
Sokoloﬀ and Zolt (2005) document the evolution of tax systems in the Americas from the
nineteenth century, and show how wealth and bequest taxes were less signiﬁcant in Latin America
as opposed to North America.
The radical diﬀerences between the current systems of taxation between developed and underde-
veloped countries, with wealth and bequest taxes playing a minor role in the latter, are documented
by Burgess and Stern (1993).
93.2 Wealth inequality and structural reallocation
To understand the potential determinants of bequest tax revenues in the past century, we also
collect information on the underlying economic fundamentals and in particular on the evolution of
wealth inequality and the process of structural transformation from agriculture to manufacturing.
Recent empirical evidence has shown that wealth inequality has declined dramatically during
the twentieth century. Wolﬀ (1996) ﬁnds a reduction in wealth inequality in the US, UK and Sweden
in samples initiating at the beginning of the 1920s, conﬁrming previous ﬁndings by Atkinson et
al. (1989) on the fall in the share of top wealth-holders in the UK. Further long-term evidence on
the basis of tax records is collected by Kopczuk and Saez (2004) and Atkinson and Piketty (2007)
for a selection of OECD countries over samples initiating in the early 1910s. Despite this common
trend, countries still diﬀer considerable regarding their degrees of wealth inequality. Kapteyn and
Panis (2003) show that in 1998 the ratio between median and mean net wealth was 41.4 in the US
and 57.2 in Italy.
The same period also witnesses an acceleration of the structural transformation of the most
advanced countries from agricultural to industrial economies, with a parallel shift from land to
capital as the main component of national wealth. Industrialization and capital accumulation can
be proxied by the proportion of the labor force in agriculture, which drops continuously throughout
the century for all countries, despite marked diﬀerences both in the initial conditions and in the
speed of the process. In the US, for instance, the agricultural share drops from 37.6% in 1900
to 3.3% in 1980, while in Italy it drops from 61.8% to 14.6% over the same period (the source is
Banks, 2001). Cross-country direct evidence on wealth composition is presented for the year 2000
by Davies et al. (2006), who show that real assets, particularly land and farm assets, are more
important in less developed countries. Historical data are scarce, but Frankema (2006) provides
estimates for the pre-war Gini coeﬃcients of land holdings for a sample of countries and shows that,
in the 1930s, they were higher in Western Europe than in the US (with Italy at 71.5, Germany
at 70.5, the UK at 62.6, and the US at 60.1). Moreover, land inequality appears to be relatively
stable over the twentieth century, despite the inﬂuence of some post-war agrarian reforms. By the
1980s, it is actually larger in many countries (with Italy at 73.3 , the UK at 64.4, and the US at
71.9).
103.3 Political institutions
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the historical evidence related to the evolution of political in-
stitutions during the period under consideration, with a focus on the extension of the franchise.
The goal is to compare the timing of this process with that of the economic transformations just
described. Following Bendix (1978) and Flora (1983), again we will refer to a few case studies,
starting with the United Kingdom, where suﬀrage was gradually extended over the course of the
nineteenth and early twentieth century. The 1832 Reform Act granted voting rights to the top 3.5%
of population, while the 1867 Second Reform Act extended them to the 7.7%, followed by further
extensions. It is only in 1918 that universal male (over age 21) and female (over 30) suﬀrage was
introduced with the Representation of the People Act, which lifted all property restrictions at least
for men.
The history of suﬀrage in the United States is written through constitutional amendments,
starting with the 1870 15th Amendment, which barred state laws from restricting any race from
voting, until the 1964 24th Amendment, which stated that neither Congress nor the states may
condition the right to vote in federal elections on payment of a poll tax or other type of tax.
In Italy a ﬁrst extension of the property-based electoral law was introduced in 1882, while
universal male suﬀrage was only reached in 1912 for 30 years old, and in 1918 for 21 (even though
women were allowed to vote only in 1946).
Most of the other Western European countries, as well as Canada, Australia and New Zealand,
reached universal men suﬀrage by 1920. To conclude, the years immediately following World War
I witness the completion of a widespread democratization process initiated during the previous
century. Still, voter turnout remains low in most countries at least until World War II.
4 The model
4.1 Production
The economy displays two speciﬁc-factor technologies, producing an agricultural good and a man-
ufacturing good using three factors: land, capital, and labor. Land is in ﬁxed supply, and equal to
L. At time t, production of the agricultural good, Y A
t , uses labor NA





11where 0 <α<1. Production of the manufacturing good, Y M
t , uses labor NM







The agricultural good is not storable and can be used only for consumption, while the man-
ufacturing good can either be used for consumption or bequeathed to children, who will in turn
employ it as capital in the manufacturing sector. Labor is perfectly mobile between sectors at no
cost.
4.2 Endowments
We consider a non-overlapping generations model with bequests where individuals live for a single
period. There is no population growth, so that each individual gives birth to a single child, to
whom he leaves a bequest. All individuals are born with a unit of homogeneous labor endowment
which is supplied inelastically. Each individual also receives a capital bequest ki
t. The distribution
of initial capital bequests is assumed to be skewed to the right, i.e., the median capital bequest
km
0 is smaller than the mean k0. Since ours is not a theory of how wealth inequality is generated,
we simply assume it as a fact. The distribution of capital bequests evolves over time but as we
will show its property will persist. Finally, each individual also receives a land bequest ei, i.e., a
fraction of the ﬁxed amount of land L. While the evolution of capital bequests will be optimally
determined through individual maximization, land is simply passed on from each individual to his
only child,9 so that the distribution of land is time invariant.10 The distribution of land bequests
is also assumed to be skewed to the right, i.e., the median capital bequest em is smaller than the
mean e. Moreover, we assume that the distributions of land and capital are perfectly correlated




k0 . The latter assumption is
actually not required for the subsequent analysis and is simply introduced for the sake of realism.
At each time t, total bequests are the sum of land and capital bequests, i.e., bi
t = ki









Initially, the aggregate size of the capital is small relative to land, so that aggregate initial
wealth in the economy is composed mostly of land.
9A market for land could be introduced but would not allow a closed form solution. The fact that land has always
been less liquid than capital, because of entails and other forms of legal limitations to the alienation of family land,
is widely documented by historians (Goody et al., 1976) and justiﬁes our simplifying assumption.
10Frankema (2006) conﬁrms the substantial stability of Gini coeﬃcients for land holdings throughout the twentieth
century.
124.3 Preferences
Individual preferences are given by
ui
t =( 1− δ)logci
t + δ logki
t+1 (3)
where ci
t is the individual’s level of consumption, such that ci
t = cAi
t + cMi
t , where cAi
t and cMi
t are
the individual consumption levels of the agricultural and manufacturing goods, respectively. The
agricultural and manufacturing goods are assumed to be perfect substitutes in consumption, i.e.,
their relative prices are ﬁxed and set equal to 1. The term ki
t+1 represents the capital bequest
for the child, and δ is a preference parameter, such that 0 <δ<1. The ‘joy of giving’ bequest
motive that we assume is analytically convenient since it implies that the individual does not
perceive any indirect eﬀects of current choices on future decisions. Moreover, under our assumptions
on preferences a bequest tax is not going to aﬀect the consumption-bequest decision. Thus our
formulation allows to focus on the redistributive impact of taxation without having to worry about
distortions and a potential equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ.






t is individual income.
Production in both sectors takes place in each period by combining labor, land and capital
according to equations (1) and (2), so that each individual receives a wage income from his labor
endowment, an interest income from his capital bequest, and a rental income from his land bequest.
The level of the wage earned in agriculture and manufacturing is identical since labor is perfectly
mobile. Moreover, wage income is identical for all individuals since labor endowments are homo-
geneous, while interest and rental incomes are proportional to capital and land. Thus this model
generates a degree of wealth inequality which is higher than that of wage and income inequality,
as suggested by the data. After receiving their income net of taxes, individuals make consumption
and capital bequest decisions by maximizing (3) subject to (4). We can derive the indirect utility
function as
vi
t =l o gIi
t + ξ (5)
where ξ =( 1− δ)log(1− δ)+δ logδ.
134.4 Bequest taxation
Bequest taxation is set through a political choice under majority voting. We initially assume full
suﬀrage. Each individual casts a vote at each period on the contemporaneous level of the tax, τt,
such that 0 <τ t < 1, to be imposed on the bequest he receives. The tax rate is simply proportional.
Since the bequest distribution varies over time, as we will show the level of the tax chosen by the
median voter will also vary.
While capital and land bequests are subject to the same tax rate, we assume that capital is
harder to tax than land, so that a fraction θ of capital avoids taxation, while land is fully subject
to it. We interpret θ as a parameter, rather than a choice variable, since it is meant to capture
structural characteristics of a tax system which are determined by civic culture, and in particular
by citizen attitudes toward governments, and cannot be aﬀected by routine ﬁscal policy decisions.11
Bequest taxes are subject to proportional collection costs τ2
t . Net tax revenues are equally
redistributed in proportion to total bequests. This redistribution scheme implies that even the
poorest individual has a stake in the tax determination process. There is no other form of taxation
and government expenditures. In particular, to impose a wage income tax would not make sense
from a redistribution point of view since the wage is identical for all individuals.
Government revenues in intensive form at each t are given by τt(1 − θ)kt + τte − τ2
t (kt + e).
Setting a government balanced budget, all revenues are redistributed. The resulting expression for
individual income, assuming no depreciation, is given by
Ii
t = ωt +[ 1+rt − τt(1 − θ)]ki
t +( 1+ρt − τt)ei +( τt − τ2
t )(kt + e) − τtθkt (6)
where ωt is the wage rate, rt is the interest rate on capital and ρt is the rental rate on land.
The way the tax is levied is crucial for future tractability of the model: here we assume that
the tax is paid out of the bequest received, without aﬀecting its ability to be used in production.
Consequently, individuals receive interest and rental income over the full amount received as a
bequest, and pay the tax after investing it. The fact that the tax does not reduce the amount
individuals invest is realistic, since bequest taxes are commonly paid in delayed installments over
al o n gt i m ep e r i o d . 12
11Alm and Torgler (2007) measure the impact of cultural diﬀerences on tax compliance.
12As a third alternative, one could have assumed the tax tob ei m p o s e do nt h ee n t i r ea m o u n to ft h eg r o s si n c o m e
generated by the investment, thus aﬀecting the wage rate in general equilibrium and complicating the analysis without
adding any additional insight. See also footnote 12.
14To be noticed is that, as long as some manufacturing good is consumed, the price of the
manufacturing good in terms of the agricultural good is 1, so that we can simply sum up all income
components in (6). Moreover, as the analysis below will clarify, we can also assume that the price
of land in terms of capital is 1, even though strictly speaking the price of land is not deﬁned in a
model where land never goes to market. Therefore, we can simply sum up the capital and land
holdings which appear in (6). Since the tax rate is proportional, it also represents at each t the
share of tax revenues over total income.
5 Analysis of the model
5.1 Factor prices


























t are the wage rate in agriculture and manufacturing, respectively. Perfect labor
mobility implies that ωA
t = ωM









which shows that the number of workers in manufacturing is an increasing function of the level of
the capital stock.
An implication of (11) is that ρt = rt. Therefore, even if the price of land is not deﬁn e di nt h e
absence of a land market, we can deﬁne its implicit price in terms of the present discounted value
of the rents accruing to it. It follows that the implicit price of each unit of land will always be
equal to the price of capital, as previously assumed in (6).
155.2 Utility maximization
The solution to the individual optimization problem is given by the following consumption and
capital bequest functions:
ci





with total individual bequest being given by bi
t+1 = ki
t+1 + ei.
Maximizing the resulting indirect utility function (5) with respect to level of the tax, we obtain







t + θkt + ei
kt + e
] (14)
Since the second order condition is satisﬁed so that indirect utility is single-peaked with respect
to the tax rate, we can apply the median voter theorem and assert that under majority voting and
our assumptions on the distribution of bequests the median voter will set a positive level of the tax
τm















To close the model, we now derive the market-clearing condition for the capital market, which
aggregating over individual incomes can be written as
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)[Yt +( 1− τm2
t )(Kt + L)] (16)
where Yt = Y A
t + Y M
t .14 Market clearing in the labor market obtains for
NA
t + NM
t = Nt (17)
The agricultural and manufacturing goods markets must also be cleared at each t,i m p l y i n g
13Under an alternative tax scheme with the tax imposed on gross income, the problem would not deliver a closed
form solution, and possibly not even single-peaked preferences, due to the fact that factor prices would become a
function of the tax itself, with the wage rate decreasing and the interest rate increasing with the tax.
14The unit price assumption, together with our preferences, implies that some manufacturing goods must be
consumed, otherwise the price of the manufacturing good would have to be higher than the price of the agricultural
good. In other words, Kt+1 <Y
M









t N + Kt+1 (19)
From (11) and (17) we can derive the following expression for total output at each t:
Yt = {[ψ(Kt)]1−αKα
t +[ 1− ψ(Kt)]1−αLα}N1−α (20)
where ψ(Kt) ≡ Kt
Kt+L.
5.4 Dynamic political-economic equilibrium










such that at each t utility and proﬁts are maximized, all markets clear, and the tax rate is optimally
set by the median voter, starting from a given initial value of K0 > 0.
The equilibrium path solves simultaneously equations (7) − (10), (12), (13), and (15) − (19).
The evolution of individual capital bequests is given by
ki
t+1 = δ[ωt +( 1+rt − τm
t (1 − θ))ki
t +( 1+ρt − τm
t )ei +( τm
t − τm2
t )(kt + e) − τm
t θkt] (21)
while the evolution of the average capital-bequest level can be tracked by
kt+1 = ∂[ωt +( 1+rt − τm
t (1 − θ))kt +( 1+ρt − τm
t )e +( τm
t − τm2
t )(kt + e) − τm
t θkt] (22)
which can be restated as
kt+1 = δ[yt +( 1− τm2
t )bt] (23)
Along the equilibrium path, workers migrate to the manufacturing sector as the capital stock
grows, while the agricultural sector shrinks. Therefore, the agriculture share of output varies in-
versely with the level of development. At the same time, the size of the capital stock increases
while the quantity of land is invariant, so that wealth and bequest composition also evolves. In the
long run, the dynamical system evolves towards a steady state which is associated with constant
values K, B, Y A, Y M, NA, NM,a n dτm. The steady state average capital k solves the following
expression:
17k = δ[eαnA1−α + kαnM1−α +( 1− τm2)(k + e)] (24)
where nAand nM are the steady-state fractions of labor in agriculture and manufacturing, respec-
tively. Steady-state total average bequests are given by b = k + e. Because of the collection costs
captured by τm2, the higher the tax, the lower the associated k. Moreover, the higher θ, the lower
the tax and the higher is steady-state k. By (11), the tax system also aﬀects labor mobility and
structural reallocation from agriculture toward manufacturing.
The evolution of individual capital bequests leads to a steady state capital bequest given by
ki =
δ
1 − δ[1 + r − τm(1 − θ)]
[ωt +( 1+ρt − τm)ei +( τm − τm2)(k + e) − τmθk] (25)
where capital inequality simply depends on initial land inequality, even though the relative weight of
land inequality is diluted at steady state by the growth of the capital component of total bequests.
Similarly, bi = ki+ei. Thus, even though initial land inequality prevents convergence of the capital
and bequest distributions to full equality, the dynamics of the system predict a gradual reduction of
capital and bequest inequality. Nevertheless, km
t <k t at each t,c o n ﬁrming the property assumed
for the initial distribution of capital and also implying that wealth inequality always remains higher
than wage and income inequality. Moreover, while convergence is accelerated by the redistribution
scheme, accumulation is slowed down by the costs of collection.
5.5 The comparative statics of bequest taxation







bt , captures the standard Meltzer and Richard (1981) mechanism: the
preferred tax is higher, the smaller is the median bequest if compared with the average bequest,
where both components of the bequest are treated symmetrically. When tax avoidance is absent





bt ), so that the gap between the median and the mean
bequest is the only relevant consideration: the tax rate is strictly positive as long as the median
bequest is lower than the mean, otherwise the median voter would set the tax at 0. Thus, in a full
compliance, symmetric tax system, bequest inequality is the only determinant of the tax rate.
However, for θ>0, the third term in square brackets increases with θ and with the gap
between the median and the mean of that bequest component - capital - which is associated with
tax avoidance. It follows that the tax rate chosen by the median voter is decreasing in the avoidance
rate for capital exhibited by the tax system, and that the negative impact of θ on τm
t intensiﬁes with
18capital inequality as a proportion of total wealth. Capital inequality therefore induces a reduction
of the tax rate below its full compliance, maximum level. The third term can be interpreted as
a measure of the asymmetry in the tax system due to the dysfunctions of capital tax collection.
In particular, when θ =1 , i.e., capital completely avoids taxation, the level of the tax is at its
minimum, since the asymmetry induced by tax avoidance is maximized. Expression (15) reduces
to 1
2(1 − kt+em
kt+e ), which implies that land inequality is the sole determinant of the tax rate in each
period.15 These results can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 At each t the level of the tax rate τm




decreases with the tax avoidance rate for capital θ.
5.6 The evolution of bequest taxation
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which is smaller than 1, thus indicating a decline toward a steady state value.
By inspection of (26), the decline of the tax rate chosen by the median voter is caused by several
forces. The evolution of wealth inequality enters through the ﬁrst term, which is smaller than 1
because capital inequality declines and the gap between mean and median capital is reduced over
time. To be noticed is that the larger is land inequality, i.e., the diﬀerence e − em, the slower the
strength of this ﬁrst factor, since land inequality is time invariant.16
However, the ﬁrst term includes another force which aﬀects the evolution of taxation in the
opposite direction: the larger is tax avoidance for the capital component of wealth, the weaker
the impact of capital equalization and the slower the decline of the tax. Therefore, tax avoidance
delays the adjustment of the tax system to the changing wealth distribution. This channel is
active independently of the agriculture share of output and wealth, as long as some degree of






bt+1, where the ﬁrst term is smaller than for a positive θ, thus implying a faster decline of
15For the sake of comparison, the tax rate in this case is also below the level that would apply to a scheme according
to which taxes and transfers are solely determined on the basis of land holdings.
16As already discussed in Section 3 and in footnote 10, our assumption is consistent with the available evidence.
17The impact of θ w o u l do n l yv a n i s hi fl a n di n e q u a l i t yw e r ea b s e n t ,w i t he = e
m- which never occurs here - and
does not depend on the fraction of land over total bequests.
19the tax. In other words, under full compliance the equalization force exerts its maximum impact
on tax reduction. On the other hand, if capital fully avoids taxation and θ =1 , (26) simpliﬁes
to bt
bt+1, so that the decline of the tax is purely associated with capital accumulation. Finally, it
should be noticed that the impact of θ on the process is gradually reduced as capital bequests tend
to equalization. In other words, in more capital-equal economies the asymmetry between capital
and land matters less, while it matters more when capital inequality is still relatively large. Over
a cross section, this implies that diﬀerences in tax avoidance behavior tend to be more important
in more unequal countries.
Finally, the second term in (26), which is smaller than 1, also contributes to the decline of the
tax because it reﬂects the growing collection costs associated with accumulation.
Our main results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Over time the sequence of tax rates {τm
t }∞
t=0 decreases with the reduction of bequest
inequality and with capital accumulation, at a rate which is decreasing in land inequality and in the
tax avoidance rate for capital θ. The impact of θ is increasing in capital inequality.











which is bounded above 0 by the presence of land, preventing the convergence to 1 of the second
term and to 0 for the third. The steady state level of the tax is increasing in inequality and
decreasing in tax avoidance. In particular, in a full compliance system the steady state tax is given
by 1
2(1 − km+em
k+e ), which is higher than its full avoidance analog, 1
2(1 − k+em
k+e ).
The implications of the decline of taxation for the evolution of average and individual capital
and bequest are the following. By (24), k is aﬀected by the tax, but in turn the tax will have
reached its minimum level by the time a steady state is reached. Therefore, in the limit, the impact
of the tax on total capital and bequests will be negligible. In the long run the impact of taxation
on individual capital will also become negligible, with the wage rate and initial land holdings
representing its main determinants. On the other hand, the relative weight of initial land holdings
will also be reduced by the process of development, while at the same time the unit rent will
decline. Therefore, the common wage component will constitute the most important determinant
of individual capital holdings in the long run. It is the growing role of labor income in wealth
20determination that drives the process of equalization in this model.18
To sum up, the evolution of taxation in this model is shaped by wealth equalization, sectoral
reallocation, and by the avoidance rate exhibited by the tax system relative to the capital component
of wealth. The eﬀect of inequality reduction is magniﬁed by the process of capital accumulation,
which further accelerates the decline of the tax. Moreover, larger compliance implies a larger level
of taxation but also its faster decline, while avoidance makes the tax system slow to adjust to the
changing structure of the economy, especially when a country is still in a relatively agricultural stage
and landed property is very concentrated. The policy implications are that, as the distribution of
bequests equalizes over time, the political justiﬁcation for bequest taxation should also decline, and
that at the same time high avoidance keeps taxation at a low but persistent level throughout the
process.
5.7 Franchise requirements and the initial rise of bequest taxation
In this ﬁrst extension of the basic model we allow for franchise requirements to be imposed on the
voting mechanism. While there is a well-established literature which has dealt with the historical
reasons for the observed expansion of the franchise,19 the scope of the present paper is just to
evaluate its eﬀect on the issue of interest, by considering an exogenous franchise requirement for
participation in the voting process.20 The requirement is expressed in terms of a minimum bequest
level. This wealth threshold is not to be strictly interpreted as a rule speciﬁed by the voting
mechanism and thus potentially set and adjusted by the elite in power, but as a parameter meant
to capture the broader fact that an exogenously-determined socioeconomic status is necessary to
permit political activism. Under this assumption, we can apply to the model previously developed
the main intuition advanced by Meltzer and Richard (1981), according to which extensions of the
franchise should be accompanied by an increase in tax revenues, and study how the interaction
between franchise extension and the evolution of wealth inequality, taking into account sectoral
reallocation, aﬀects tax policy.
18The process of wealth equalization does not depend on the presence of land and would occur in any economy
with a growing capital stock and homogeneous labor endowments. The presence of land only prevents convergence
to full wealth equality and a null level of the tax.
19See Justman and Gradstein (1999), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Bertocchi and Spagat (2001), Lizzeri and
Persico (2004), Llavador and Oxoby (2005), Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2006), and Cervellati et al. (2005).
20Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Bertocchi and Spagat (2004) and Bertocchi (2006) also introduce an exogenous
franchise requirement.
21L e tt h ef r a n c h i s er e q u i r e m e n tb es e ta tab e q u e s tl e v e le b ≥ b0. In other words, initially the
median voter is richer than the mean individual. This implies τm
0 =0 . The accumulation process
provokes growth of the average bequest. Nevertheless, taxation will not be introduced until the
time t0 at which a suﬃcient number of people have crossed e b, so that the median voter is poorer
than the mean: this implies τm
t0 > 0. At this early stage, when wealth is mostly constituted
by land, the relative avoidance rate of the tax system, and in particular capital tax avoidance,
represent marginal considerations. After t0 the tax rate keeps increasing under the pressure of
further franchise expansion, while at the same time it also reﬂects the continuous decline of wealth
inequality and industrialization, in a way which is inversely related to the avoidance rate, according
to the previous analysis. The turning point in the evolution of tax revenues depends on the joint
dynamics of democratization and wealth equalization. The tax rate starts its decline when the
latter force becomes stronger than the former. In particular, after full democratization is reached,
the tax rate can only decline. This pattern replicates the humped-shaped long-term evolution of
the bequest tax for those countries that are now modern industrial democracies, where the tax is
introduced and progressively expanded in the nineteenth century when wealth inequality is still
very high, reaches a peak during the initial decades of the twentieth century, and is subsequently
reduced.
Moreover, the same framework can also explain why diﬀerent countries historically developed
diﬀerent modern systems of taxation. Sokoloﬀ and Zolt (2005) analyze the comparative evolution of
tax systems in the Americas over the past two centuries and document that in the nineteenth cen-
tury Latin America designed a highly regressive system, while North America embraced a progres-
sive one. This pattern is associated to the much higher degree of economic and political inequality
in Latin America, which allowed the local elites to develop a tax system that preserved inequality.
In our framework, a relatively high franchise requirement, and/or extreme poverty on the lower
side of wealth distribution, could indeed prevent democratization as well as the implementation of
tax policies for a protracted period of time.
Finally, this version of the model can also suggest another reason - beside high avoidance - for
the deep contrasts still existing today between the tax systems of modern industrial democracies
and those of underdeveloped countries, with the latter showing much less reliance on bequest and
wealth taxation, and progressive taxation in general. These diﬀerences can be explained by the
low degree of democracy prevailing in most underdeveloped countries acting in combination with
extreme inequality.
225.8 Summary and discussion
In the extended model with franchise requirements, bequest tax revenues, as a share of income,
are shown to increase initially and then decrease. Democratization, wealth equalization, industri-
alization and the avoidance rate reﬂected by the tax system contribute to the determination of this
hump-shaped evolution. The purpose of this subsection is to compare the implications of the model
with the evidence presented in Section 3. Our theory suggests that in an initial stage, under the
pressure of democratization, bequest tax revenues should increase, in the face of an initially high
degree of wealth inequality. Indeed, Figure 1 conﬁrms that for a sample of European countries the
share of inheritance tax revenues over total tax revenues increases until a peak which is reached,
on average, around 1910, after a ﬁrst wave of electoral reforms that signiﬁcantly expand the voting
franchise. Despite the fact that the democratization process is not yet completed in 1910, since
the universal franchise is only reached in most countries in the next decade, while full democrati-
zation as captured by voter turnout is further delayed until after World War II, after 1910 we start
observing a decline of the tax which can be explained by the decline of wealth inequality and the
simultaneous process of industrialization, as suggested by our model. However, while the process
of industrialization is relatively continuous throughout the twentieth century, inequality reduction
really does not start until the early 1920s according to the data reported in Section 3. Therefore, it
is important to notice that, while the analysis derives implications for the income share of bequest
taxation, the available data reported in Figure 1 reﬂect the share of bequest taxation out of total
tax revenues. Since total tax revenues over income are quickly increasing in Europe in this period,
as documented by Lindert (1994), it is legitimate to date the turning point for the income share of
bequest taxation to a decade or two after 1910, consistently with the inequality reduction facts.
The available data on tax compliance are also consistent with the role that our model assigns
to this parameter, with low-compliance Continental European countries exhibiting lower, but more
stable bequest tax shares than the high-compliance UK. Moreover, as predicted by Proposition 2,
t h ei m p a c to ft a xa v o i d a n c eo nt he speed of adjustment is magniﬁed by land inequality, consistently
with the fact that the latter appears to have been lower in the UK than in the rest of Europe.
The US ﬁt this overall picture only partially, because of the late introduction of the bequest
tax. This is consistent with a delayed development of the entire welfare state in this country.
Nevertheless, the ﬁgure conﬁrms also for the US the presence of a hump-shaped evolution with a
drastic drop of revenues immediately after World War II, followed by substantial stability. Once
again, this pattern closely reﬂects the fact that the 1940s witness in this country an acceleration of
23the decline in wealth concentration and a further shift toward manufacturing.
6E x t e n s i o n s
6 . 1 I n c o m et a x a t i o na n dt h es i z eo fg o v e r n m e n t
In this subsection we add income taxation in the form of wage taxes. The goal of this exercise is
to introduce a preliminary analysis of a more complete system of taxation, and at the same time
to oﬀer an explanation of the expansion of the size of government, which has been documented for
the post-war period despite the decline of bequest taxation. Once again, we exploit the asymmetry
between the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, by assuming that manufacturing wages are
easier to tax than agricultural wages. Given the diﬀerent ways production is organized in the two
sectors, with larger and more urbanized production units in manufacturing, this assumption is
easily justiﬁed. To simplify the analysis, we in fact assume that a wage tax is exclusively imposed
on manufacturing wages. We further assume that the tax rate on manufacturing wages is set at an
exogenous constant level, τw, and that revenues from wage taxes are earmarked to ﬁnance in each
period government expenditures gt, while revenues from bequest taxes are set and distributed as
previously assumed. Within this framework, industrialization will determine an expansion of the
tax base for wage taxation, thus allowing an expansion of government expenditures at a rate which
is linked to the rate of growth of employment in manufacturing, which as a country industrializes
is higher than the rate of growth of total income before a steady state is reached.
Thus, combining the two forms of taxation, even if redistributive bequest taxation declines
over time, the size of government can actually increase because of the government expenditures
component. Since in 1999 the latter represented the bulk of total government outlays (69.5% and
62.2% in the US and the EU, respectively)21, our theory of bequest taxation can be reconciled with
the overall evidence on the evolution of government budgets.
6.2 Land vs. housing
While in our model wealth reallocation from land to capital is one of the driving forces behind the
long-term evolution of bequest taxation, another crucial distinction, between physical capital and
housing, becomes even more important in current policy applications. Land and housing share the
common feature of being relatively easier to tax than capital. However, unlike land, the distribution
21The source are OECD data as elaborated by Alesina et al. (2001).
24of real estate is increasingly characterized by the fact that the middle class holds an overwhelming
proportion of wealth in it, in the form of principal residence. This is due to the fact that, on the one
hand, poor people are liquidity constrained and cannot aﬀord to buy a house, while on the other
residential investment only needs to absorb a fraction of total wealth for the rich. Decomposing
inequality by wealth components in order to incorporate this assumption would make the model
more complicated. However, the dynamics would be simpliﬁed by the fact that one would not need
to embed a reallocation mechanism from capital to real estate. While we leave this extension for
future research, it is clear that a middle class with a higher stake in an easy-to-tax asset would
only push toward an even lower level of the tax rate, conﬁrming our original intuition regarding
t h er o l eo fl a n d .
7C o n c l u s i o n
Our goal was to explain the comparative evolution of bequest taxation in a historical perspective.
To this end, we have developed a dynamic, two-sector version of the Meltzer and Richard (1981)
median voter model where taxes are imposed on bequests. Wealth is more unequally distributed
than income, because it is transmitted through unequal bequests. However, since the model allows
the distribution of wealth to evolve over time, bequest taxation as set by a median voter also
evolves over time. The model also captures the impact of industrialization on the bequest tax base,
through an asymmetry between land and capital taxation. The convergence of wealth distribution
and industrialization, due to the growing role of labor income, imply a gradual decline of bequest
taxation, but the asymmetry in the tax avoidance rate between land and capital also matters, with
a high rate of avoidance for capital negatively aﬀecting both the level and the speed of adjustment
of the tax to the changing economic structure, especially when a country is still in a relatively
agricultural stage. The results match the relevant stylized facts regarding bequest tax revenues, as
well as the dynamics of wealth inequality, structural reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing,
and tax compliance.
Adding initial franchise requirements to this framework allows to reproduce the humped-shaped
long term evolution of the bequest tax starting from the nineteenth century for those countries
that are now modern industrial democracies. Moreover, our conclusions can be reconciled with the
available evidence on the growing size of government, and can be extended to a framework where
real estate, rather than land, is the relevant alternative to capital.
25The implications of these results for policy is that, if the pattern exposed by the recent long
term investigations of wealth inequality in rich democracies is not to be reversed in the future, the
fate of the death tax is probably going to be death. On the other hand, for developing countries
with high rates of tax avoidance, extreme wealth inequality and/or undemocratic political systems,
the current burden of bequest and wealth taxes appears to be too low, making the case for an
expansion of this policy tool in the future.
While the present investigation has been mostly focused on bequest taxation, a goal for future
research is to understand those factors that have shaped the evolution of the broader institutions
of taxation across diﬀerent countries. While so far we have highlighted the role of wealth inequality
and structural reallocation, other factors such as the share of wages over proﬁts, the impact of
globalization, as well as ethnic conﬂict and family structure, can also be evaluated as potentially
relevant. This research would extend our understanding of how institutions interact with the
processes of economic growth and development.
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